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Abstract 
 
International climate negotiations take place in a setting where uncertainties regarding the 
impacts of climate change are very large. In this paper, we examine the influence of 
increasing the probability and impact of large climate change damages, also known as the ‘fat 
tail’, on the formation of an international mitigation agreement. We systematically vary the 
shape and location of the distribution of climate change damages using the stochastic version 
of the applied game-theoretical STACO model. Our aim is to identify how changes to the 
distributional form affect the stability of coalitions and their performance. We find that fatter 
upper tails increase the likelihood that more ambitious coalitions are stable as well as the 
performance of these stable coalitions. Fatter tails thus imply more successful, or ‘fatter’, 
international climate agreements. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Avoiding dangerous interference with the climate system requires substantial reductions in 
global emission levels (IPCC, 2007). Large regional differences in the costs and benefits from 
emission reductions complicate international coordination of these mitigation efforts. The 
efficient level of mitigation efforts can be attained through global cooperation, i.e. by forming 
an international environmental agreement (IEA) in which all countries participate. Due to the 
public good nature of the climate system, however, countries benefit from the mitigation 
efforts of other countries even if they do not contribute by reducing their own emissions. 
Hence, free-riding behaviour becomes attractive and motivates some countries to stay outside 
the coalition. As there is no supra-national authority to decide which countries should 
undertake mitigation efforts and how much emission reductions should be conducted, 
international negotiations have to rely on attaining a self-enforcing agreement.  
 
This debate’s complexity is further amplified by the inherent uncertainties related to the 
climate system. Uncertainties and risks in the climate system are compounded with 
uncertainties surrounding the economic evaluation of the impacts of climate change.
4
 One key 
uncertainty in evaluating climate policies relates to the (small) possibility of very large 
damages. The more likely these events are, the more they influence the optimal policy 
response. The sensitivity of policy responses outcomes to high-consequence, low-probability 
impacts has been discussed in various climate models (e.g. Dietz, 2009; Anthoff and Tol, 
2010). 
 
In this paper we augment this line of research by examining the influence of increasing the 
probability of large climate change damages, also known as the ‘fat tail’, on the stability and 
performance of an IEA.
5
 What will happen to the size of IEAs if the likelihood of very high 
                                                          
4
 Uncertainties and risk are inherent in the climate system. In the STACO model we track the influence of risk 
and uncertainty by performing Monte Carlo simulations, specifying different distributional forms and 
parameters. We do not make a strict distinction between the terms uncertainty and risk, but use both terms to 
refer to an unknown impact of climate change. 
5
 Weitzman (2009a, 2009b) initiated the discussion on ‘fat tails’ by criticising Integrated Assessment models 
(IAMs) for underestimating climate change damages. With reference to Nordhaus (2009), we assume explicitly 
that IAMs remain a valid tool as Weitzman’s invalidating conditions do not apply to the wide range of climate 
scenarios investigated here, as long as the model allows for some mitigation action and carefully specifies the 
distributional forms to represent uncertainty. Within these boundaries we apply alternative scenarios and 
examine their impact on the stability and performance of an IEA. The expression ‘fat tail’ is used to describe a 
distribution in which high impacts have a higher probability than can be expected based on a normal distribution.  
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climate damages increases? Are countries more likely to join an international coalition when 
they face greater uncertainty and risk about climate change damages? Can high, but unlikely, 
impacts ensure larger (joint) mitigation efforts? Using the stochastic version of the STACO 
model (Dellink et al., 2008), we analyse the extent to which IEAs are affected by varying 
degrees of climate change risks.   
 
The basic structure of the STACO model consists of interacting regions that (i) choose to join 
an international mitigation agreement or not, and (ii) choose their optimal mitigation policy 
given the coalition formed. Regions are characterised by their abatement costs and damage 
cost functions and linked via global abatement (mitigation) efforts. Dellink et al. (2008) 
introduce uncertainty in the STACO model by specifying a set of stochastic parameters in the 
cost and benefit functions. Moreover, they introduce the concept of stability likelihood (SL), 
linking uncertainties about costs and benefits of mitigation efforts to the stability of IEAs. In a 
set of basic sensitivity analyses, Dellink et al. (2008) show that the value of the SL for a 
specific coalition mainly depends on two elements: the variance in regional benefit shares of 
mitigation as well as the variance and level of the global benefit parameter.
6
 
 
Dellink and Finus (2012) extend the analysis of Dellink et al. (2008) by introducing transfers 
among coalition members. They focus their analysis on the impacts of learning effects, i.e. 
how the resolution of uncertainty affects stability, building upon Na and Shin (1998); Kolstad 
(2007); Kolstad and Ulph (2008); Kolstad and Ulph (2011). Dellink and Finus (2012) show 
that the common conclusion from the papers by Kolstad and Ulph that learning leads to worse 
outcomes in terms of welfare and environmental quality does not have to hold when (optimal) 
transfers are available.  
 
Compared to Dellink et al. (2008) and Dellink and Finus (2012), this paper shifts focus from 
general uncertainty analysis to assessing the impact of the risk of very high climate damages. 
It provides a more rigorous analysis of the impact of the probability of highly disruptive 
climate change damages on the stability and performance of climate coalitions. Fat tails in the 
distribution of mitigation benefits are introduced by (i) increasing the variance of the global 
benefit parameter, and (ii) opting for asymmetric distributional shapes. By selecting the 
                                                          
6
 In the STACO model benefits are characterised by a stream of prevented climate damages due to mitigation 
efforts.  
 4 
appropriate parameter values we are able to increase the density in a specific tail. Based on 
these systematic variations in the properties of the global benefit parameter, we subsequently 
conduct a regression analysis. Our aim is to assess the impact of fatter upper tails of the 
distribution on the SL and related performance measures (as defined in Section 2) of all 
coalitions in the STACO model. We find that many coalitions are only stable in the trivial 
case when climate change has a net positive impact on a global scale, because joining the 
coalition does not require any mitigation efforts in this case. We find that by shifting mass to 
the upper tail, i.e. by increasing the likelihood of very high damages, both strict stability 
likelihood and performance of an international mitigation agreement increases. In other 
words, fatter tails do imply more successful, or ‘fatter’, international climate agreements. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 give an overview of the theory on 
coalition formation and the properties of the applied STACO model. Section 4 outlines the 
scenarios used in this study, focusing on distributional changes of the global benefit parameter 
and the introduction of fat tails. Thereafter, Section 5 presents the results of an econometric 
analysis quantifying the impact of increased climate change risks on the stability likelihood 
and the performance of coalitions. Implications and limitations are discussed in concluding 
Section 6.  
 
2. Coalition formation 
 
2.1. A model framework for coalition formation 
We adopt a standard framework of cartel formation with single deviations, following Barrett 
(1994). Consider a set of N heterogeneous players, each representing a country or world 
region. Each player is involved in a two-stage coalition formation game. In the first stage, 
players decide whether to become a member of an IEA or to remain an outsider. 
Announcement ci = 1 implies that player i joins the coalition, while ci = 0 indicates player i 
stays out of the coalition. The coalition structure can be summarised by the announcement 
vector c = (ci …,cN). Players announcing 1 are called coalition members and together they 
form coalition  Nicik i ,...,1,1|  . The terms coalition structure c and coalition k can be 
used interchangeably. We denote the set of possible coalitions by K.
7
 In the second stage, 
                                                          
7
 Note that there are 2
N
 announcement vectors, but there are only 2
N
-N different coalitions as coalitions of only 
one member are trivial. 
 5 
players decide on their mitigation (abatement) levels as illustrated by the abatement vector 
).,...,( 1 Nqqq   Due to the public good nature of climate change, the benefits from mitigation 
(i.e. prevented climate damages) are driven by global abatement levels, while costs of 
mitigation are borne locally. Thus, each player's payoff ),( bqi  depends on the global level 
of abatement, its own abatement level and a vector of model parameters b.
8
  
 
The game is solved backwards assuming that strategies in each stage form a Nash 
equilibrium. For the second stage, this entails that a Partial Agreement Nash equilibrium is 
formed between coalition members k and the non-signatory players J (Chander and Tulkens, 
1995). The coalition acts as one player and maximises its joint payoff. Simultaneously, each 
non-signatory player optimises its own payoff by selecting its abatement level conditional on 
the abatement levels of coalition k and other non-signatory players –J.  
 



ki
Jki
ki
Jki kibqqbqq ),,(),,(
***         (1) 
* * * * *( , , , ) ( , , , )i k i J i k i Jq q q b q q q b i J            (2) 
 
Equations (1) and (2) describe the necessary conditions for a Nash equilibrium in stage two, 
where qk is the abatement vector of coalition k, qJ the abatement vector of all non-signatories;  
qi is the abatement of player i if it is a non-signatory, and q-J the abatement vector of all other 
fringe players except i. An asterisk denotes equilibrium strategies. This implies that the 
behaviour of non-signatories towards all other regions is selfish and non-cooperative; 
signatories behave in a cooperative way towards their fellow coalition members, but non-
cooperative towards outsiders. The equilibrium strategy vector q* corresponds to the classical 
´social or global optimum` if coalition k comprises all countries, i.e. the grand coalition, and 
corresponds to the classical Nash equilibrium if coalition k comprises only one member or is 
empty. Any inefficiency stems from the fact that k is not the grand coalition. Olieman et al. 
(2006) prove that, in the context of our simulation model, the equilibrium abatement strategy 
vector q* is unique for every coalition and a given vector of parameters. Consequently, there 
is a unique equilibrium payoff for every coalition
*( , ) ( ( , ))i iv k b q k b . 
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 Note that the payoff function is purely a monetary measure and not a fully specific utility function. A non-
linear utility function would affect the preferences of countries to join the coalition, but is beyond the scope of 
the current paper. 
 6 
 
Following d’Aspremont et al. (1983), the first stage Nash equilibrium requires that no 
signatory that announced ci = 1 should have an incentive to change its announcement to ci = 0 
and no non-signatory that announced ci = 0 should want to announce ci = 1, given the 
announcement of all other players. The former is labelled internal stability and the latter 
external stability. The stability condition can be summarised compactly by f(k,b), which 
assigns the value 1 to a stable coalition (i.e. stable announcement vector) and the value 0 to an 
unstable coalition. In Equation (3), k-i represents the coalition where region i changed its 
announcement vector. It is worth noting that for any given set of parameters b, this function 
allows for either a unique stable coalition, multiple stable coalitions or no stable coalition at 
all.
9
 
 
1 ( , ) ( , ) 0 
( , )
0
i i iv k b v k b i N
f k b
otherwise
   
 

      (3) 
 
We compute the average aggregate valuation, i.e. global payoff, over the (non-dominated) 
coalitions by (4), where S is the number of non-dominated stable coalitions: 
 
  1
( , ) ( , )
N
i
k K i
f k b v k b
v b
S
 
 
         (4) 
 
The formation of large stable coalitions may be hampered in the absence of transfers (Carraro 
and Sinisalco, 1993). Due to the asymmetry across players, some benefit more than others 
from a specific coalition. Signatory players with high marginal benefits have an incentive to 
share a part of their surplus with other signatory countries to make the coalition stable. In 
other words, a transfer scheme may exist that makes coalition k internally stable. The type of 
transfer scheme plays a large role in determining the stability of coalitions (Carraro et al., 
2006; Nagashima et al., 2009). In this paper, we follow Carraro et al. (2006) and Weikard 
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 We check the stability condition by changing the announcement vector of one player at a time. Due to these 
single deviations, multiple stable equilibria are possible. In the case of multiple stable coalitions, we assume that 
each of them is equally likely to occur. There is a probability that one of them is (Pareto-)dominated by another 
stable coalition. The STACO model controls for this by assigning the set of Pareto-dominated coalitions a zero 
probability of occurring. The remaining set of stable coalitions is used to evaluate the success of coalition 
formation. 
 7 
(2009) by applying the concept of “optimal transfers” or, as labelled by Carraro et al. (2006), 
“an almost ideal transfer scheme”. Under this transfer scheme every coalition member 
receives its free-rider payoff when unilaterally leaving the coalition, plus an (arbitrary) share 
of the surplus. The latter is the aggregate payoff of the coalition minus the sum of free-rider 
payoffs. Accordingly, transfers are only paid among coalition members, and these transfers 
balance.
10
 
 
2.2. Uncertainty, the concept of stability likelihood, and performance indicators 
In a deterministic model, the vector of the model parameters b may be based on empirical 
estimates and detailed bottom-up impact assessments. When contradictory information is 
available for a specific model parameter, a meta-analysis of empirical studies and other 
available information can be used to infer an appropriate distributional form to characterise 
the uncertainty about its value. We incorporate parameter uncertainty in the model by 
declaring a set of stochastic parameters. Each stochastic parameter b is replaced by an 
independent distribution g(b|θ), where the set of hyper parameters θ characterises the shape 
and support of the probability density function g(∙). 
 
The way players respond to uncertainty in the game depends on the extent to which they learn 
about the true parameter values. Kolstad et al. (2007) distinguish three types of learning. 
When ‘no learning’ effects occur, decisions in both stages are based on maximising expected 
values.
11
 In the case of ‘partial learning’ players learn about the true parameter values after 
the first stage, but before declaring their abatement levels. Decisions in stage one are therefore 
still based on expected payoffs from each coalition in stage two. ‘Full learning’ implies that 
players learn about the true parameter values at the start of the game.  
 
Each coalition is either stable or unstable under no and partial learning, because decisions in 
the first stage are based on expected values of stage two outcomes. Under full learning the 
stability of a coalition is conditional on the true parameter value(s), since all uncertainty is 
resolved before stage one. Conditional on the specific parameter values, the game reduces to a 
deterministic model under full learning. Ex ante the true parameter values are, however, 
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 The interested reader is referred to Weikard (2009) for more details on the sharing scheme. Note that when 
coalitional payoff is insufficient to compensate all free-rider payoffs, the coalition becomes internally unstable. 
11
 The STACO model described in the next section is linear in parameters (but not in abatement levels). Hence, 
the expected payoff is equal to the payoff based on the expected parameter vector (Dellink et al., 2008). 
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unknown. The concept of stability likelihood (SL) applies to this situation. The SL can be 
interpreted as the probability that coalition k is stable:  
 
( ( , ) 1) ( , ) ( | )kSL P f k b f k b g b d

      
 
We approximate the SL using Monte Carlo simulations, because the heterogeneity of players' 
payoff functions in the STACO model precludes the existence of an analytical solution to this 
integral.
12
 By generating M samples from g(.) we can approximate the SL for coalition k by  
 
1
1ˆ ( , )
M
m
k
m
SL f k b
M 
  ,  
 
where b
m
 represents the draw for b in sample m. Accordingly, the value for the binary stability 
condition f(k,b) may vary over the draws. A more detailed discussion of the SL concept and 
computation can be found in Olieman et al. (2006). 
 
The no learning case provides a useful benchmark for comparing model results, since the 
model effectively reduces to a deterministic setting using mean values. Also under partial 
learning the fatness of the upper tail of climate damages increases the expected value of the 
global benefit parameter and associated abatement efforts, but limited information is obtained 
on how the shape and support of the distribution for the global benefit parameter affect the 
stability and performance of coalitions. The full learning case is more suitable for our research 
question, as the Monte Carlo analysis provides information on stability and performance at all 
realisations of the (set of) uncertain parameter(s).  
 
Apart from the SL measure, average payoff values and average abatement efforts (again 
averaged over all M samples), we introduce two additional performance indicators for each 
coalition. Success of a coalition is defined as the product of its stability likelihood and the 
average global payoff over all M samples: 
 
                                                          
12
 We are not aware of any paper that provides analytical solutions of stable coalitions in the context of 
heterogeneous players even in the absence of uncertainty. 
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 
1 1
,
ˆ
M N
m
i
m i
k k
v k b
Success SL
M
  

        (5) 
 
For example, the grand coalition generates the highest payoff from mitigation efforts, but is 
likely to have a low SL due to free-riding incentives that increase with coalition size. Its 
success will therefore be limited. Other coalitions may be more successful due to a higher SL 
despite the reduction in payoff.  
 
Our second indicator of performance, efficiency, corrects for a potential level effect related to 
payoffs. We relate the payoff of coalition k to the payoff of the grand coalition (GC), which is 
fully efficient, and the payoff of the all singletons coalition (AS) which is least efficient. 
Conditional on the SL, the closer a coalition’s payoff is to the GC, the larger its efficiency.  
 
   
   
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
, ,
1ˆ
, ,
M N M N
m m
i i
m i m i
k k M N M N
m m
i i
m i m i
v k b v AS b
Efficiency SL
M
v GC b v AS b
   
   
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
    (6) 
 
3. The STACO model 
 
3.1. Calibration of the deterministic STACO model 
In this section, the calibration of the applied model, called STAbility of COalitions (STACO) 
is described; see Nagashima et al. (2009) and Dellink and Finus (2012) for more details. The 
model comprises benefit and cost functions of abatement efforts of twelve world regions: 
USA (USA), Japan (JPN), European Union (EEC), other OECD countries (OOE), Eastern 
European countries EET), former Soviet Union (FSU), energy exporting countries (EEX), 
China (CHN), India (IND), dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil (BRA) and ‘rest of the 
world’ (ROW). Region i’s payoff from abatement is given by: 
 
 
1
(1 ) ( ) ( )
T
t
i it t it it it
t
r B q C q F 

            (7) 
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where T denotes the time horizon t = 1,…,T; r the discount rate; Bit benefits from global 
abatement 
1
N
t it
i
q q

  and Cit abatement costs from regional abatement of CO2 qit. Receipts 
from international transfers (endogenously determined in the model as explained in Section 
2.1) are denoted by Fit. The payoff function is expressed in terms of the net present value of 
the regional abatement levels over the time period of interest. In this case, we apply a period 
of 100 years, starting in 2011, and a constant discount rate r of 2%, which roughly resembles 
a zero pure rate of time preference. Following Nagashima et al. (2009), the benefit function is 
a linear approximation of a three-layer carbon cycle linking current global abatement 
activities to a stream of future avoided damages as proposed by Nordhaus and Zhang 
(1996).
13
  
 
Benefits from abatement in period t, as defined in (8), equal the net present value (in period t) 
of future avoided damages.  
 
    ( ) (1 ) 0
T
t z
it t iz t iz t
z t
B q r D q D q

            (8) 
 
Future avoided damages are calculated by contrasting the damage function Diz under no 
abatement efforts in period t and under global abatement efforts qt. The damage function links 
abatement efforts and climate impacts by assuming an exogenous path of radiative forcing 
from non-CO2 greenhouse gases. It is defined by: ( ) γiz t i z t t i zD q c q s Y       , where ic  is a 
scaling parameter that has no effect on benefits in (8) as it cancels out; 
-z t tq   reflects the 
impact of abatement in period t on atmospheric concentrations in period z; 
is  are (stochastic) 
regional damage shares and zY   is the (stochastic) scale parameter of global damages 
multiplied by (future period) global GDP.
14
 In the following, we label γ the global benefit 
parameter as benefits arise from prevented climate damages. The benefit function is linear, as 
it combines a (more or less) quadratic relation between damages and temperature change with 
a (by approximation) log-linear relationship between the stock of greenhouse gases and 
temperature change, features which are not uncommon in IAMs (e.g. Nordhaus and Yang, 
1996). This delivers a linear function for the relevant domain of the stock of greenhouse 
gases. The model thus captures the stock pollutant aspect with inertia in the climate system, 
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 While this may ignore much of the interactions that take place in the climate system, it suffices for our goal of 
valuing the benefits of abatement activities.  
14
 Projections for GDP are taken from the MIT-EPPA model (Paltsev et al., 2005). 
 11 
see Dellink et al. (2010) for more details. The impact of non-linear benefits has been explored 
using a deterministic version of the STACO model in Weikard et al. (2006), who find only 
minor implications for stability of coalitions.  
 
Abatement costs Cit are formulated following Ellerman and Decaux (1998), adjusted for an 
exogenous technological progress parameter ( =0.005) to reflect the dynamic nature of our 
model, with additional (stochastic) parameters i  and i : 
 
1 13 2
3 2
( ) α (1-ς) β (1 ς)t tit it i it i itC q q q                (9) 
 
The benefit and cost functions are fully specified to obtain a payoff function that can be used 
for the numerical analysis, since analytical results cannot be obtained for the STACO model 
(Finus et al., 2006).  The chosen functional forms are relatively flexible and commonly used 
functional forms. One essential property of these functions is that the resulting payoff 
function is concave, i.e. there are diminishing returns to abatement.  
 
3.2. Uncertainty in the STACO model and strict stability likelihood 
In this paper we take uncertainty about the climate and economic systems into account by 
specifying a distribution for the key parameters that describe costs and benefits of abatement 
action: [γ, α, β, s].15 For the region specific parameters αi, βi, and si we use exactly the same 
set-up as Dellink et al. (2008) and apply respectively a normal distribution for αi and βi, and a 
restricted gamma distribution for si. The latter restriction assures that the regional shares sum 
to one. The values for the parameters characterising the distributions are also equivalent to 
Dellink et al. (2008). The most important parameter for studying the influence of fat tails on 
coalitional stability and performance is the global benefit parameter γ. We specify a base 
scenario in which a normal distribution is specified for γ, with its mean and standard deviation 
based on the meta-analysis presented in Tol (2009). Their values are respectively set to 120 
$/tC and 148 $/tC.    
 
                                                          
15
 During the Monte Carlo sampling procedure 20,000 samples are generated from their respective probability 
density functions. The discount rate is not specified as a stochastic parameter, since raising the discount rate in 
the STACO model has an equivalent impact as a lower mean value of gamma (Weikard et al., 2006). 
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In this base scenario, climate change can have positive and negative economic impacts, i.e. 
the global benefit parameter can be respectively negative (positive climate change impacts) 
and positive (negative climate change impacts).
16
 A negative (or zero) value for γm implies 
regions have no incentive to conduct any abatement. Optimal payoffs are therefore zero 
regardless of the coalition formed. Then all coalitions are trivial and stable by definition, as 
they do not commit to action. The reader should keep in mind that the SL increases when the 
percentage of negative samples in the Monte Carlo analysis increases. The level of the 
performance indicators will be affected when comparing the performance of coalitions across 
alternative distributional specifications using the SL concept. To handle this aspect of the 
numerical model, we use the term of strict stability likelihood (SSL), which is defined as the 
SL minus the fraction of samples with negative draws (where climate change impacts are 
positive) during the Monte Carlo procedure. Strict stability likelihood reflects the model 
specification where trivial coalitions are not counted as being stable. The performance 
indicators success and efficiency are adjusted accordingly by replacing the SL by the SSL in 
equations (5) and (6).  
 
4. Fat tail scenarios  
 
Debates regarding uncertainty about climate change impacts are generally focused on low-
probability, high-impact scenarios located in the upper tail of the global benefit parameter. 
Weitzman (2009a, 2009b), for example, argues that society has an infinite expected loss from 
such scenarios, if the upper tail is sufficiently fat. He calls for a precautionary approach where 
policies are based on preventing the worst case scenario. As argued in the introduction, we 
take a different approach and explicitly assume the expected value of climate change impacts 
remains finite, thereby assuming that IAMs and Cost-Benefit analysis remain valid tools for 
policy analysis. Within these boundaries, we are interested in the consequences of varying 
degrees of uncertainty, represented by different scenarios that vary the distribution of the 
global benefit parameter γ, on coalition stability and performance. Discussions on ‘fat-tailed’ 
climate change uncertainty generally focus on the upper tail of the distribution of climate 
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 Note that regional benefit shares are bounded from below at zero. This precludes situations where some 
countries have positive damages, while others have negative damages. While this is clearly a limitation of the 
model that affects the outcomes of the simulations, Dellink et al. (2008) present a sensitivity analysis on the 
gamma distribution by replacing it with a normal distribution, which implies that regional shares can become 
negative. They find that the impact on the stability analysis is very limited. Moreover, given the focus of our 
paper on the high end of the damage function, it is not unreasonable to assume that damages will be positive in 
all regions.  
 13 
change impacts (e.g. Tol, 2009). Therefore, we investigate the impacts of increasing the upper 
tail of the respective distribution on coalition formation.  
 
Climate uncertainty (and risk) and the fatness of the upper tail are measured in this paper by 
means of the four distributional moments, i.e. mean, standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis. There is not a single moment that specifically determines the fatness of the tail; 
rather, a specific combination of the different moments increases the probability of very high 
damages. Increasing the probability of high climate impacts may stem from an increase in the 
mean of the global benefit parameter, spurring abatement efforts and potentially cooperative 
behaviour.
17
 The standard deviation captures the degree of uncertainty, i.e. spread, in climate 
change impacts. An increase in the standard deviation makes both tails of the distribution are 
fatter, i.e. more extreme samples become more likely, including very high damages. The 
skewness measures how symmetric the uncertainty is. Fat tails are generally characterised by 
left- (or negatively) skewed distributions, implying that the majority of observations has a 
value larger than the mean. Decreasing the skewness implies that the probability of high-
impact events increases, relative to low-impact events. Finally, the kurtosis measures how 
closely the distribution is centred around the mode. The higher the kurtosis, the more uniform 
predictions about climate change impacts are, i.e. there is a large peak in the distribution. Fat 
upper tails are therefore mainly captured by the mean, standard deviation and skewness of the 
distribution of the global benefit parameter, while the kurtosis measures the extent to which 
uniform (or dispersed) predictions have an impact on the stability and performance of 
coalitions. Various degrees of climate change risks are imposed in our simulation model by 
specifying a set of alternative scenarios varying in (i) the distributional form, and (ii) the level 
of the underlying distribution-describing parameters. Accordingly, the four moments of the 
distribution of the global benefit parameter systematically vary across the scenarios allowing 
for an identification of the impact of fat tails on coalition formation and performance. 
 
Our base scenario assumes a normal distribution for global benefits. The normal distribution 
has the characteristic of being symmetric and unbounded. In the first set of scenarios we 
increase the expected value of climate benefits by increasing the mean of the normal 
distribution by the factors [1.5; 2; 3; 4; 5]. In a second set of scenarios we increase the 
standard deviation by the same factors, while keeping the mean fixed. The normal distribution 
can, however, not be used to test the influence of all four moments, as its skewness and 
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 However, increasing mean benefits also increases free-riding incentives.  
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kurtosis are constant. Therefore, we propose the use of three asymmetric distributions, 
respectively the gamma, beta, and double-sided exponential. For each of these distributions, 
we specify a reference scenario (as listed in Annex II) and then vary the parameters as 
described below.  
 
Each of these distributions has specific convenient properties. The gamma distribution has a 
pre-defined lower bound of climate damages
18
, but damages can still reach up to infinity. The 
gamma distribution is right-skewed and approaches a normal distribution for specific 
combinations of the mean and standard deviation. We propose another set of five scenarios 
where we use the same mean value as in the normal distribution, but increase the standard 
deviation by the same factors as in the normal case. This increases the fatness of the right tail, 
but also implies more draws closer to the lower bound. The latter is a direct consequence of 
fixing the mean at 120 $/tC. In other words, the standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis are 
increasing in these scenarios (see Annex II).  
 
The beta distribution is very flexible and can accommodate both left- and right-skewed 
shapes. We define its shape through a lower and upper bound, a mean, and standard deviation 
parameter. Values for the lower bound, mean and standard deviation are again set at 
respectively -80, 120 and 148 $/tC. The upper bound is assumed to be at 675 $/tC in those 
scenarios (the 99
th
 percentile in Tol, 2009). By increasing the mean, compared to the 
reference scenario, we gradually work towards a left-skewed distribution with a large 
probability of high climate change damages. In a separate set of scenarios we gradually 
increase the upper bound to 3375 $/tC, while keeping the other parameters constant. This 
results in a set of right-skewed distributions with increasing skewness and kurtosis.   
 
Finally, we use a double-sided exponential function as applied in Dellink et al. (2008). By 
applying a double-sided distribution we can independently alter the shape of both tails of the 
distribution. We base the parameter values again on Tol (2009) and specify the 5% mass point 
at -45 $/tC and the 95% mass point at 410 $/tC. The mode of the distribution is set at 49 $/tC 
and there is a 35% probability of positive climate change impacts, i.e. negative benefits (γ) 
from mitigation. For the exponential distribution, we specify a set of alternative scenarios 
around its reference specification. First, we increase the upper bound and thus the upper tail. 
                                                          
18
 Following the meta-study by Tol (2009) the lower bound of climate damages is set at -80 $/tC in all scenarios, 
based on the 1
st
 percentile for global damages. 
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Second, we reduce the probability of having observations below the mode and thereby 
increase the mass in the right tail.  
 
In total this results in a set of 41 scenarios with varying distributional shapes. See Annex I for 
a full overview of input parameters and Annex II for a full overview of the resulting sample 
moments. In contrast to Dellink et al. (2008), this set of scenarios allows for a structured 
econometric analysis of increased climate change risk and the influence of the four 
distributional moments on the stability likelihood and other performance indicators.  
 
5. Simulation results: the impact of fat-tailed distributions on the stability of coalitions 
 
5.1. Simulation results in the no-learning and full-learning case 
To become familiar with the results from the STACO model, we begin with a discussion of 
the outcomes for the no-learning case for the normal distribution, our base scenario. The 
results are presented in Table 1. Three specific coalitions are presented, the all singletons, the 
grand coalition, and the best performing coalition (BPC). The latter is defined as the stable 
coalition with the highest expected global payoff from abatement, i.e. the coalition that scores 
best on our indicator of success. Total annual abatement efforts and global payoff are lowest 
in the AS case and highest for the GC. Obviously, most abatement efforts take place in the 
regions with low marginal cost, i.e. the USA and China, and abatement efforts increase due to 
the cooperative behaviour of coalition members. The net present value of global payoff for the 
GC is highest, but the positive values in the incentives column denote that the coalition lacks 
internal stability. In fact, all regions have an incentive to change their announcement and 
leave the GC. Remember that the sum of individual incentives to free-ride equals the required 
transfers to keep a player aboard, while the associated gains from cooperation are the 
additional gain for the coalition from moving from 11 to 12 players. For very small coalitions, 
the additional gain from cooperation is relatively large (as joint abatement efforts are still 
modest) and existing members can compensate the potential new member for foregone free-
rider profits through the transfer scheme. As the coalition becomes larger, free-rider 
incentives increase and simultaneously the additional gains from cooperation for existing 
coalition members decrease. At some point, the free-rider incentives are larger than the 
additional coalition gains and the coalition is no longer potentially internally stable. 
The BPC is both internally and externally stable, since none of the regions has a positive 
incentive to change its membership. Amongst its five members - China, DAE, EET, India, 
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and the US - China conducts the most abatement. The transfer column shows that the US pays 
all other coalition members, but especially China, to conduct these abatement efforts and to 
keep the coalition internally stable. The US benefits from these additional coalition members 
through its high level of marginal benefits.
19
  
 
Table 1: No learning outcomes base scenario (normal distribution) 
 
All singletons 
(AS) 
Grand coalition 
(GC) 
Best performing coalition 
(BPC) 
Regions 
Annual 
abatement 
NPV 
of payoff 
Annual 
abatement 
NPV 
of payoff 
Incentives Transfers 
Annual 
abatement 
NPV 
of payoff 
Incentives Transfers Membership 
 % of BAU bln US$ % of BAU bln US$ bln US$ bln US$ % of BAU bln US$ bln US$ bln US$  
USA 0.016 4431 0.037 11957 3575 -3117 0.022 6214 -40 -2406 1 
JPN 0.006 3820 0.023 10582 3164 -4071 0.006 7542 -769 0 0 
EEC 0.013 4898 0.030 13164 3936 -5214 0.013 9842 -989 0 0 
OOE 0.009 809 0.047 2378 711 220 0.009 1598 -79 0 0 
EET 0.008 305 0.075 901 269 800 0.046 571 -4 225 1 
FSU 0.011 1474 0.041 4214 1260 273 0.011 2932 -222 0 0 
EEX 0.004 685 0.049 1982 593 952 0.004 1352 -61 0 0 
CHN 0.028 1202 0.100 2800 837 7583 0.086 1641 -11 1614 1 
IND 0.018 986 0.100 2800 837 1288 0.063 1728 -11 327 1 
DAE 0.004 537 0.059 1569 469 835 0.032 989 -6 241 1 
BRA 0.000 338 0.011 1026 307 -199 0.000 665 -13 0 0 
ROW 0.010 1248 0.050 3568 1067 650 0.010 2480 -171 0 0 
Total 0.014 20733 0.052 56941 17026 0 0.028 37554 -2376 0 5 
 
In the full-learning case, stability depends on the resolution of uncertainty in each sample of 
the Monte Carlo procedure. Hence, the concept of SL plays an important role. Table 2 shows 
that the AS and the GC have a relatively low SL of 21 per cent. That is, for most realisations 
of the global benefit parameter these coalitions are unstable. The coalition with the highest 
stability likelihood (HSLC) has eight members and abates (on average over all draws) 
substantially more than the AS coalition. The number of coalition members in the BPC, the 
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 Whether such a set of international transfers is politically realistic remains to be seen, but there is no doubt that 
countries with high benefits have an economic incentive to finance mitigation in other countries. 
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most successful coalition, is larger than in the HSLC from a global perspective. That is, the 
increase in benefits from additional cooperation outweighs the marginal reduction in SL. Note 
that the BPC in Table 2 differs from the BPC in Table 1 due to the alternative treatment of 
uncertainty in determining membership and abatement efforts in both settings.  
 
Table 2: Highest SL and best performing coalition in the full learning base scenario  
 
Abatement 
% of BAU 
Payoff 
bln US$ 
Incentives 
bln US$ 
Transfers  
bln US$ 
Abatement 
% of BAU 
Payoff 
bln US$ 
Incentives 
bln US$ 
Transfers  
bln US$ 
 AS: SL = 21.3% GC: SL = 21.4% 
Global 0.012 31412 1818 0 0.044 90669 19599 0 
 
HSLC: SL = 27.1% 
(USA, EET, EEX, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA, ROW) 
BPC: SL =.26.0% 
(all regions, except JPN, EEC) 
USA 0.022 12759 124 -4304 0.025 14644 1617 -5039 
JPN 0.006 14370 -1558 0 0.006 17145 -2642 0 
EEC 0.012 18896 -1872 0 0.012 22569 -3298 0 
OOE 0.008 3158 -268 0 0.032 3103 436 101 
EET 0.046 1072 51 493 0.051 1177 167 573 
FSU 0.009 5648 -592 0 0.029 5252 784 -237 
EEX 0.029 2325 136 541 0.033 2573 380 613 
CHN 0.067 3402 162 2969 0.070 3858 511 3578 
IND 0.059 3106 231 237 0.063 3491 518 320 
DAE 0.036 1734 146 359 0.040 1940 313 449 
BRA 0.007 1130 92 -111 0.008 1258 205 -196 
ROW 0.031 3761 255 -184 0.034 4236 608 -162 
Total 0.029 71360 -3092 0 0.034 81246 -400 0 
 
The lower part of Table 2 presents the regional-specific abatement and payoff levels for the 
HSLC and BPC under our base scenario and full-learning. Reported values are mean values, 
i.e. averaged over the 20,000 draws in the Monte Carlo procedure. In the HSLC and the BPC, 
the USA again subsidises China and other developing countries to become a member of the 
coalition and undertake most abatement. Note that the incentives column in Table 2 clearly 
illustrates the concept of SL. Only in 27% (26%) of the realisations of the global benefit 
parameter the HSLC (BPC) is stable, in all other cases some regions can benefit from 
changing their announcement. On average, Japan and Europe have no incentive to become a 
member of the HSLC or the BPC due to their high marginal abatement costs, while the US 
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can on average benefit from stepping out of both coalitions.
20
 All three regions have high 
marginal benefits from abatement, which makes them willing to fund abatement efforts in 
other countries. The relatively higher marginal abatement costs in  Japan and Europe makes 
these regions less attractive coalition partners than the US. Including Japan or Europe into the 
coalition instead of the US would imply shifting additional abatement efforts to the other 
partners in the coalition. In the absence of transfers all three regions are somewhat 
unattractive coalition members, because their high marginal abatement efforts stimulate free-
riding incentives while they would contribute little in terms of abatement efforts given their 
high marginal costs. It should be noted that coalitions where Japan or Europe are cooperating 
with a set of developing countries also have relatively high SL-values, but these perform 
worse in terms of global payoffs. The key message is that transfers allow the international 
agreement to be formed by almost any mixture of countries that comprises countries with high 
marginal benefits and countries with low abatement costs. Attractiveness of partners depends 
on the relation between marginal abatement benefits and costs. 
 
 
5.2. The SL under alternative distributional forms 
To get a feeling for how alternative distributional forms affect the SL, the left panel of Figure 
1 depicts the samples for the global benefit parameter that have been used as an input in the 
reference case analysis for each distributional forms, i.e. normal, gamma, beta, and double 
exponential (see Annex I for specifications). The right panel presents the resulting distribution 
of the SL over all possible coalition structures. The level of the SL is comparable between the 
normal and the gamma distribution. The main difference between these two distributions is in 
the left tail, but as optimal abatement levels and payoffs are zero for any level of global 
benefits below zero, the exact shape of the left tail is not relevant for the coalition stability. 
The double exponential brings about significantly lower SL values than the normal case, 
whereas the beta distribution shows the highest SL levels. As mentioned in Section 3.2, the 
differences in the level of SL across all distributional forms are mainly caused by the share of 
negative draws for the global benefit parameter (i.e. positive climate change impacts) in our 
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 By definition, the incentive not to join a coalition (i.e. the incentive for a current free-rider) is the inverse of 
the incentive to free-ride for the enlarged coalition, where the same player is a member. The overarching idea of 
the ‘incentive’ column is that negative values indicate a contribution to stability, while positive values 
undermine stability. 
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Monte Carlo analysis. This inspires us to us the concept of Strict Stability Likelihood in 
Section 6. More interesting is the right tail of the SL distribution function: very few coalitions 
have a substantially higher SL than the minimum, i.e. the kurtosis of the distribution is very 
high. We investigate this result in detail in Section 6.2. 
 
   
 20 
Figure 1: Inputs and SL for the reference scenarios  
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Table 3: Outcomes under full-learning for alternative distributional specifications 
  Normal  Gamma 
  
SL 
% 
Payoff 
bln US$ 
Abatement 
MtC (%) 
Incentives 
bln US$ 
Non-
Members 
SL                  
% 
Payoff           
bln US$ 
Abatement 
MtC (%) 
Incentives   
bln US$ 
Non-
Members 
AS 21.3 31412 880(0.01) 1818  21.2 30264 800(0.01) 1715  
GC 21.4 90669 3260(0.04) 19599  21.3 85252 3020(0.04) 17858  
HSLC 27.1 71360 2140 -3092 
JPN, EEC, 
OOE, FSU 27.1 69114 2020 -1968 
USA, JPN, 
FSU 
BPC 26 81246 2540 -400 JPN, EEC 25.8 76594 2330 -277 JPN, EEC 
Negative 
draws (%) 
21.3 
 
21.2 
 
Expected 
outcome  64686 1950 
  
 61222 1780 
  
  Exponential Beta 
  
SL                  
% 
Payoff           
bln US$ 
Abatement 
MtC(%) 
Incentives   
bln US$ 
Non-
Members 
SL                
% 
Payoff           
bln US$ 
Abatement 
MtC(%) 
Incentives   
bln US$ 
Non-
Members 
AS 12.9 31952 860(0.01) 1817  25.8 32008 820(0.01) 1826  
GC 13.1 89439 3290(0.04) 18542  25.9 90226 3000(0.04) 18875  
HSLC 19.5 72442 2190 -2090 
USA, JPN, 
FSU 31.1 74924 2090 -2273 
EEC, JPN, 
FSU 
BPC 18.1 80345 2530 -395 JPN, EEC 30.3 81051 2330 -374 JPN, EEC 
Negative 
draws (%) 
12.9 
 
25.8 
 
Expected 
outcome  64467 1940    64949 1790 
   
 
Table 3 presents SL, payoff and abatement levels for key coalitions as well as the share of 
negative draws for each of the four reference scenarios. In terms of coalition members, the 
BPC is continuously formed by the same countries across the alternative distributional forms, 
and is only lacking Japan and Europe as members. The HSLC is only the same for the gamma 
and double exponential scenario. For all coalitions, mean payoffs, reported in Table 3, are 
lowest for the gamma distribution. Since the mean and standard deviation for the normal and 
the gamma distribution are identical and the number of negative draws is very similar, the 
differences in mean payoffs can only be attributed to the upper tail, caused by variations in 
skewness and kurtosis of the gamma distribution. The right-skewness of the gamma 
distribution implies a smaller upper tail and suggests that fat tails may not complicate 
coalition formation (as the BPC is the same), but they have a positive effect on abatement 
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efforts and payoffs. The payoffs for the double exponential and beta distribution are 
comparable to the payoff for the normal base scenario, even though they have different 
skewness and kurtosis properties. This preliminary comparison of distributional forms is 
therefore insufficient to draw robust conclusions on the influence of changes in the upper tail 
on coalition formation. 
 
The shaded rows in Table 3 reflect the expected outcomes for the specific scenario across all 
stable coalitions. Since it is not clear which stable coalitions will emerge in case of multiple 
stable coalitions, we define in each sample m the set of (undominated) stable coalitions, 
assign them an equal probability of occurrence and calculate mean payoff and abatement 
efforts for that sample. Expected outcomes reflect the average of these values over all 20,000 
samples. Again the results for the double exponential and beta distribution are comparable to 
the payoff in the normal scenario, while for the gamma distribution, these values decrease by 
at least 5 per cent, which is in line with the results for individual coalitions discussed above. 
 
6. Regression results: The impact of fat tails on coalition stability and performance 
 
6.1. The regression setup 
For each of the four distributional forms, multiple scenarios are included which differ in terms 
of a single input parameter relative to a reference scenario. By adjusting a single parameter, 
either the location or the shape of the distribution is adjusted, which directly affects one or 
more of the sample moments and thus the fatness of the tail.
21 
 The 41 scenarios are expected 
to have an impact on the SL, success, and efficiency of each of the 4084 possible coalition 
structures.
22
 This provides us with a total number of 167,444 observations; one for each 
coalition in each of the 41 scenarios. We track the impact of these scenarios on the three 
performance indicators of interest (SL, success, and efficiency) using a regression analysis.  
 
Two types of explanatory variables are included in the analysis. First, the scenario is 
summarised by the four sample moments (mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis) 
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 Note that our scenario selection mainly represents cases with high kurtosis when distributions are right-
skewed. This affects the impact of the kurtosis on performance negatively. 
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 From the total of 4096 coalitions, all but one of the thirteen possible AS coalitions are excluded. We keep the 
AS coalition with no members. Using a definition for the AS with a single member would only affect the 
underlying incentives to change announcement, but not the performance of the coalition, 
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for the global benefit parameter as applied in the Monte Carlo analysis.
23
 Second, we 
characterise the coalitions by a set of explanatory variables. It should be noted that the 
coalitions are constant across the scenarios and therefore do not reveal variations in their cost 
and benefit structures (parameters). Given that we only vary one dimension at a time, 
interactions between the coalitions and the scenarios are not directly taken into account. We 
chose to characterise coalitions in two alternative ways:  
 
In Specification I, the coalition is described by specifying its member countries. The costs and 
benefits of abatement efforts for each country are described by three parameters, respectively 
a regional benefit share, si and two cost parameters, αi and βi. Given that these parameters are 
constant for each country across the scenarios, these operate like constants and can be 
summarised by country dummies. We introduce a set of dummies, which are set to 1 if a 
country is in the coalition and 0 otherwise. Every coalition structure can thus be created using 
country dummies, without inducing the incidental parameter problem (Lancaster, 2000).  
 
These country dummies do not pick up interactions between particular countries and their 
impact on e.g. the stability of a coalition. We therefore present Specification II that focuses on 
the characteristics of the coalition rather than its member states. Explanatory variables are 
included describing the size of the coalition and the expected share of benefits covered by the 
members (i.e. the sum of the mean of si over the member states). Moreover, we stipulate that 
the stability, success, and efficiency of a coalition depend on the interaction between the 
member states. For example, countries with high benefits of abatement, but with high 
marginal costs, want to team up with low-cost countries to achieve their abatement efforts. 
Hence, we classify each coalition, except the AS, into a particular class.  
 
We create 9 classes using the cost and benefit parameters of each country. Countries are 
grouped into three categories, respectively high, medium, and low, for both their costs and 
benefits (see Annex III). Then all possible interactions are taken into account, starting from 
those that are most beneficial for coalition formation (high benefit – low cost). A coalition is 
considered to be high benefit – low cost, if it contains at least one high-benefit and one low-
cost country. In order for the categories to be mutually exclusive and prevent double-
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 We prefer to work with the sample moments, since this allows obtaining the same moments for all 
distributions.   
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counting, the benefits are taken as point of departure. Consequently, not all nine categories 
will be represented in the analysis. Annex III provides a more detailed overview of the 
classification procedure. Given that the AS is not included in this structure, the associated 
parameters can be interpreted as performance relative to the AS.              
 
The following subsections show our results for three different dependent variables, strict 
stability likelihood (SSL), strict success, and strict efficiency. For each of them we show two 
different sets of results: Specification I with country dummies and Specification II with 
coalition dummies. The regression setup is summarised by the following equation:  
                                                                   
Whereas s = 1, …, 41, k = 1, …, 4084 and D contains either country or coalition dummies 
depending on the specification. All models are estimated with robust standard errors, 
clustered by coalition to correct for the panel specification.  
 
6.2. Regression on Strict SL  
In this section we track the sensitivity of the Strict SL (SSL) to varying specifications of the 
global benefit parameter, while controlling for the characteristics of the coalitions 
(Specification I and II). We do not use the SL, because it contains two counteracting effects: 
the level effect introduced by the negative draws and the effect we are interested in, arising 
from the collaboration of different regions (see Section 3.2). Therefore all regressions are 
conducted with the SSL to exclude influence from negative draws.
24
   
  
As a reference case, we start off by looking at the performance of the AS coalition. It turns 
out its strict stability likelihood is zero across scenarios. In total, 192 coalitions (5%) never 
have a positive SSL, while 1781 coalitions (44%) have a positive SSL in each of the 41 
scenarios. The maximum SSL observed is 7.2 percentage points, but 97% of the observations 
have a SSL smaller or equal to 2 percentage points. The limited spread in SSL is partially 
caused by the fact that the SSL is by definition reducing in the number of negative draws. 
Moreover, the principle of single deviations ensures that if a particular size is stable, all 
coalitions with one more or one less member will be unstable. Hence, only a limited number 
of coalitions will be stable at each draw during our simulation exercise.    
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 Negative draws imply that countries benefit from climate change and form coalitions without mitigating. The 
SSL is defined in the following way: SSL=SL - % of negative draws. Effectively, this implies that trivial 
coalitions are not counted as strictly stable. 
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The results for the SSL in Specification I, using the country dummies, are presented in Table 
4. The SSL is increasing in the mean of the global benefit parameter. This implies that the 
additional benefits from cooperation outweigh the increase in free-rider incentives.
25
 
Increasing average benefits from abatement result in more stable coalitions. More specifically, 
the coefficient implies that increasing the mean of the global benefit parameter by one $/tC, 
will result in an increase of the SSL by 0.0002 percentage points. The coefficients for the 
other moments do not have a clear interpretation, since these are not related to the level of the 
global benefit parameter, but merely affect the shape of its distribution. Our result confirms 
the conclusion from Dellink et al. (2008) that higher expected benefits improve the chances 
for coalition formation. 
A higher standard deviation amplifies both the probability of positive and negative climate 
change impacts, as it essentially flattens the distribution. The former implies a higher number 
of negative draws, where coalitions are stable by definition, but not strictly stable. This leads 
to a reduction of the SSL. A high standard deviation also increases the probability of higher 
benefits from abatement efforts, i.e. the tail becomes fatter, which may therefore increase the 
size of the stability and its stability (see Dellink et al. 2008). The net effect of the standard 
deviation turns out to be negative, while the impacts of the two opposing effects cannot be 
separated out.  
A decrease in skewness results in more mass in the upper tail and highlights that a higher 
probability of large climate change impacts increases the SSL. We find that fat upper tails 
make coalitions more stable.
26
 Thus, the answer to our original research question, whether fat 
tails stimulate coalition formation, is ‘yes’. This effect comes on top of the effect that is more 
obvious, that higher mean benefits are good for coalition formation. Finally, an increase in the 
kurtosis, which puts more mass around the peak of the distribution, has a negative impact on 
the strict SL. When regions base their decisions on predictions of climate impacts that are 
conform and similar, the strict stability of coalitions reduces. Regions then seem to ignore 
contradicting estimates of climate change impacts, and outliers in the tails of the distribution 
appear to have a limited effect on the SSL. 
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 Cooperation between regions increases with higher marginal benefits from abatement as the additional 
benefits from mitigation can be used to finance transfers to keep low-marginal-cost countries within the 
coalition, thereby increasing the stability of the coalition. Simultaneously, the outside option for all countries 
increases with increasing marginal benefits, thus inducing additional free-riding incentives. The net effect is a 
priori ambiguous. 
26
 A distribution with a fat upper tail is negatively skewed.  
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The results for the moments of the global benefit parameter are all significant at the 1% level 
and constant across our two specifications, highlighting the robustness of these results. We 
now discuss the effect the characteristics of the coalition have on the SSL. In both 
specifications the constant reflects the SSL of the AS coalition (as this is an ‘empty’ coalition 
which does not pick up the effects of the country or coalition dummies). In Specification I, the 
SSL decreases when countries with high benefits, especially Japan and the EEC, enter a 
coalition. This is caused by their high marginal costs and high marginal benefits, which make 
these two regions unattractive partners. High abatement costs are clearly reducing 
collaboration, as these regions will not contribute much to the joint abatement efforts. High 
benefits have a mixed effect: they allow for larger transfers to be distributed among coalition 
members, but they force all coalition members to undertake substantially more abatement. As 
marginal abatement costs increase more rapidly than marginal benefits (quadratic vs. linear), 
this tends to have a negative net effect on the incentives of other players to join the high-
benefit countries. The USA (another high-benefit country) also has a negative impact on the 
strict SL by joining, although only significant at the 10% significance level. The low 
coefficient can be explained by its mixed attractiveness as a country with low marginal 
abatement costs, but high marginal benefits. In contrast, participation of the non-OECD 
regions increases the stability, primarily reflecting their low marginal costs, which make them 
attractive partners. As free-rider incentives increase with larger coalitions, this does not mean 
that coalitions with all ‘attractive partners’ are stable. Rather, coalitions consisting of one or 
two high-benefit countries together with one or two low abatement cost countries tend to be 
more successful in terms of strict stability likelihood.  
 
This is further illustrated by Specification II in Table 4. SSL is increasing in the number of 
coalition members, while at the same time the SSL is decreasing in the share of benefits. The 
negative quadratic effects highlight that an additional member to the coalition does not tend to 
add as much to the SSL as the previous one. Moreover, as the share of benefits accumulates, 
the free-rider incentives increase. Finally, our set of explanatory variables, characterising the 
types of coalitions, show that high-benefit members want to join up with low-cost countries. 
This category has the highest positive coefficient. Members with medium or even low 
benefits are less attractive coalition members.     
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Comparing Specifications I and II, we see that in Specification I, the country dummies pick 
up two effects, which are separated in Specification II: (i) a higher share of benefits reaped by 
the coalition decreases stability (as free-rider incentives increase), but (ii) the presence of 
high-benefit countries in the coalition benefits stability (as more transfers are available). 
 
Table 4: Regression results for strict stability likelihood 
Specification I: distributional moments and 
country dummies 
Specification II: distributional moments and 
coalition dummies 
 Coefficient Std.error   Coefficient Std.error 
Mean 0.0002 *** 0.0000 Mean 0.0002 *** 0.0000 
Standard 
dev. -0.0002 *** 0.0000 Standard dev. -0.0002 *** 0.0000 
Skewness -0.0088 *** 0.0003 Skewness -0.0088 *** 0.0003 
Kurtosis -0.0017 *** 0.0000 Kurtosis -0.0017 *** 0.0000 
USA -0.0261 * 0.0134 Coalition size 0.3810 *** 0.0228 
Japan  -0.3952 *** 0.0133 
Coalition size 
sq. -0.0112 *** 0.0021 
EEC -0.1885 *** 0.0134 
Share of 
Benefits -2.6277 *** 0.0932 
other 
OECD  -0.0957 *** 0.0134 HB/HC 0.1460 *** 0.0233 
EET 0.2534 *** 0.0134 HB/MC -0.0382  0.0488 
FSU -0.0336 ** 0.0134 HB/LC 0.3396 *** 0.0532 
EEX 0.1116 *** 0.0134 MB/MC -0.5147 *** 0.0442 
China 0.3156 *** 0.0134 MC/LC -0.0939 ** 0.0427 
India 0.2503 *** 0.0134 LB/MC -0.4493 *** 0.0496 
DAE 0.2672 *** 0.0134       
Brazil 0.2457 *** 0.0134       
ROW 0.2089 *** 0.0134       
Constant -0.0240  0.0266 Constant -0.3424 *** 0.0208 
R² 0.431   0.318 
Note: EEX: Energy exporting countries; EET: Eastern 
European countries; EEC: European Union; DAE: 
Dynamic Asian Economies; ROW: Rest of the World; 
* denotes 10% significance level; ** denotes 5%; *** 
1%. 
Note: ∑ Benefits: Share of benefits in the coalition; 
HB/HC: coalition has at least one high-benefit and one 
high-cost country; HB/MC: coalition has at least one 
high-benefit and one medium-cost country; HB/LC: 
coalition has at least one high-benefit and one low-cost 
country; MB/MC: coalition has at least one medium-
benefit and one medium-cost country; LB/MC: 
coalition has at least one low-benefit and one medium-
cost country; * denotes 10% significance level; ** 
denotes 5%; *** 1%. 
 
6.3. Regression analyses on success and efficiency 
The stability of a coalition, in the form of the SSL, provides limited information on the actual 
level of abatement conducted by that coalition or on its associated payoffs.  Similarly, high 
payoffs from abatement, e.g. for the GC, turn out to be irrelevant if the coalition has a low 
stability likelihood. Therefore, we shed more light on the impact of uncertainty and fat tails 
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on the performance of a coalition by using our two indicators: Success and efficiency, as 
introduced in Section 2.2, and corrected using the SSL.  
  
6.3.1. Performance indicator: Strict success 
As discussed in Section 2, our success measure reflects the a priori expected stable payoff of a 
coalition. Again the AS coalition acts as our reference coalition. Given that it has a zero SSL, 
it also has zero strict success for every scenario. As revealed by Specification I in Table 5, 
increases in the mean of the global benefit parameter increase the success of a coalition 
through two channels. First, the result from Table 4 transfers that increases in mean benefits 
increase the stability of the coalition. Secondly, higher benefits from abatement increase 
expected global payoffs. In this case, the additional benefits from abatement outweigh the 
additional free-rider incentives that arise at the same time.  
 
Increasing uncertainty regarding the impacts of climate change, as measured by the standard 
deviation, also increases the success of a coalition. This result is opposite from the impact of 
higher standard deviation on SSL. Like in the SSL case, a lower bound on success exists: 
when impacts of climate change become positive, countries will not undertake any abatement 
resulting in zero payoffs. This effect is ignored in the SSL measure. Increasing the mass in the 
upper tail spurs payoffs as benefits from abatement increase. The latter effect is further 
highlighted by the skewness parameter. Again, the negative parameter implies that when the 
upper tail becomes fatter the strict success of a coalition increases. Finally, parameter for the 
kurtosis reveals a similar effect as for the SSL regression. As the predictions about the 
impacts of climate change become more uniform (high spike in the density function), the 
strict success decreases. This is partially caused by the fact that our gamma distribution has a 
very strong peak with near zero impact from climate change. The results for skewness and 
kurtosis are comparable with the results from Table 4, indicating the dominance of the 
stability effect over the payoff effect from fat-tailed distributions.  
 
Again, the results are stable across our two specifications. Both regressions show that the AS 
is unsuccessful. Moreover, coalitions including low-cost countries, like China, are likely to 
improve the success of the coalition, especially in combination with high-benefit countries. 
Additional members spur the success even more, but again the impact of an additional 
member is reducing with free-rider incentives increasing. The latter is reflected by the 
negative impact of the share of benefits on success.        
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Table 5: Regression results strict success  
Specification I: distributional moments and 
country dummies 
Specification II: distributional moments and 
coalition dummies 
 Coefficient Std.error   Coefficient Std.error 
Mean 326.9 *** 7.9 Mean 326.9 *** 7.9 
Standard 
dev. 95.3 *** 1.7 
Standard 
dev. 95.3 *** 1.7 
Skewness -1408.1 *** 68.4 Skewness -1408.1 *** 68.4 
Kurtosis -605.2 *** 9.7 Kurtosis -605.2 *** 9.7 
USA -1485.6   2006.1 Coalition size 48049.8 *** 3646.5 
Japan  -54792.0 *** 2001.0 
Coalition size 
sq. -825.9 ** 355.4 
EEC -24310.0 *** 2005.5 
Share of 
Benefits -382430.1 *** 14672.0 
other 
OECD  -10288.1 *** 2008.6 HB/HC 26248.2 *** 3901.4 
EET 38586.5 *** 2012.2 HB/MC 2180.2   7807.3 
FSU -1394.2  2006.9 HB/LC 54059.4 *** 8506.8 
EEX 19944.4 *** 2011.3 MB/MC -66709.0 *** 6713.5 
China 46133.6 *** 2012.5 MC/LC -14048.6 ** 6609.4 
India 38353.2 *** 2012.2 LB/MC -57892.5 *** 7096.1 
DAE 40986.3 *** 2012.3         
Brazil 35431.8 *** 2012.2         
ROW 33435.7 *** 2011.9         
Constant -107956.2 *** 5359.4 Constant -131827.0 *** 3875.3 
R² 0.372   0.315 
Note: see Table 4 for abbreviations; * denotes 10% 
significance level; ** denotes 5%; *** 1%. 
Note: see Table 4 for abbreviations; * denotes 10% 
significance level; ** denotes 5%; *** 1%. 
 
6.3.2. Performance indicator: Strict efficiency 
Most of the results for the strict success measure transfer to the regression for strict efficiency. 
The strict efficiency measure controls for the difference in levels of payoff across the various 
scenarios. It takes the payoff of respectively the GC and AS coalition as the upper and lower 
bound, measuring the extent to which the payoff of a coalition approaches the payoff of the 
GC coalition (i.e. it calculates the gains from cooperation as a percentage indicator). Like in 
the success measure, increases in payoffs and stability are both valued positively in this 
measure, but a correction is made for the difference in the size of the gap between AS and GC 
between different scenarios. Again, the AS coalition has a reference level of zero strict 
efficiency due to lack of strict stability and no gains from cooperation.       
 
Table 6 reveals that again increases in the mean of the global benefit parameter has a positive 
effect on the regression results. As before, additional benefits from abatement stimulate 
abatement efforts in a coordinated fashion, making coalitions more efficient. The coefficient 
remains positive and significant, even when controlling for the number of countries in the 
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coalition in Specification II. Like in the SSL regression, the standard deviation has a negative 
impact on efficiency. The underlying intuition was already discussed in Section 6.2. The 
positive impact of higher standard deviation on success disappears with efficiency, as this 
impact accrues to all coalitions and therefore does not contribute to the relative gains from 
cooperation. The skewness again illustrates our main results. The larger the probability of 
high negative impacts of climate change, the more efficient coalitions will become. First, 
coalitions become more stable. Second, more countries are willing to join a coalition due to 
the expected increase in benefits from abatement. The additional free-rider incentives do not 
seem to be dominant in this process. Finally, the results for the kurtosis confirm the earlier 
insights. The lack of significance of the squared term for coalition size, which arises only in 
the regressions on efficiency, is explained by the fact that increases in the size of the coalition 
will always result in payoffs closer to the grand coalition.  
 
Table 6: Regression result for strict efficiency 
Specification I: distributional moments and 
country dummies 
Specification II: distributional moments and 
coalition dummies 
 Coefficient Std.error   Coefficient Std.error 
Mean 0.0001 *** 0.0000 Mean 0.0001 *** 0.0000 
Standard 
dev. -0.0001 *** 0.0000 
Standard 
dev. -0.0001 *** 0.0000 
Skewness -0.0033 *** 0.0002 Skewness -0.0033 *** 0.0002 
Kurtosis -0.0009 *** 0.0000 Kurtosis -0.0009 *** 0.0000 
USA -0.0006   0.0080 Coalition size 0.1319 *** 0.0157 
Japan  -0.1855 *** 0.0079 
Coalition size 
sq. 0.0013   0.0016 
EEC -0.0736 *** 0.0080 
Share of 
Benefits -1.4044 *** 0.0610 
other 
OECD  -0.0283 *** 0.0080 HB/HC 0.1280 *** 0.0171 
EET 0.1407 *** 0.0080 HB/MC 0.0486   0.0332 
FSU 0.0026  0.0080 HB/LC 0.2483 *** 0.0363 
EEX 0.0758 *** 0.0080 MB/MC -0.1964 *** 0.0273 
China 0.2176 *** 0.0080 MC/LC -0.0384   0.0276 
India 0.1470 *** 0.0080 LB/MC -0.1633 *** 0.0257 
DAE 0.1504 *** 0.0080         
Brazil 0.1266 *** 0.0080         
ROW 0.1270 *** 0.0080         
R² 0.396  0.291 
Note: see Table 4 for abbreviations; * denotes 10% 
significance level; ** denotes 5%; *** 1%. 
Note: see Table 4 for abbreviations; * denotes 10% 
significance level; ** denotes 5%; *** 1%. 
 
6.4. Main insights from the regression analysis 
Our regressions deliver a set of consistent results across the different moments of the 
stochastic benefit function (and specifications characterising the coalitions), as summarised in 
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Table 7. First, increasing expected benefits, i.e. a higher mean from abatement improves 
stability, size, and performance of coalitions. This confirms the insights from earlier studies 
(e.g. Dellink et al., 2008). Secondly, more uncertainty about the impacts of climate change 
(i.e. higher variance) reduces coordinative efforts, because more uncertainty also implies that 
positive impacts from climate change may arise. Higher variance may, however, improve the 
success of coalitions: The opportunity to avoid negative impacts of climate change by 
undertaking abatement efforts becomes more attractive, as the probability of high benefits 
from abatement rises. Thirdly, if the uncertainty is specifically directed to the upper tail, i.e. 
the fat tail of climate change (i.e. lower skewness), our analysis shows that countries are more 
willing to cooperate, which results in more stable and better performing coalitions. Fourthly, 
if predictions about climate change impacts become more uniform (i.e. higher kurtosis), our 
dependent variables show a decrease in stability. This result deserves attention since our 
scenarios mainly reveal a high kurtosis at the lower end of the distribution of the global 
benefit parameter. In policy terms, it suggests that the more we learn about climate change 
impacts (in terms of narrowing the bounds on possible impacts), the lower chances for stable 
high-performing coalitions. This mimics and to some extent qualifies the negative information 
effect found in more theoretical models such as Ulph (2004) and Kolstad and Ulph (2008). 
Fifthly, fat tails have a stronger impact of the stability of coalitions than on the performance 
of specific coalitions. Thus, they boost incentives to participate more than they boost ambition 
levels of countries. 
 
Table 7: Overview of impact of the moments of the global benefit parameter    
 Strict stability likelihood Strict success Strict efficiency 
Mean + + + 
Standard deviation − + − 
Skewness − − − 
Kurtosis − − − 
 
The other explanatory variables in our regressions also provide some robust insights. First, 
characteristics of coalitions impact stability in multiple ways: (i) larger coalitions have better 
performance, but with each new member this effect is declining, (ii) the presence of high-
benefit countries boosts participation as more transfers are available, and (iii) free-rider 
incentives increase with the ambition level of coalitions. This is in turn affected by the joint 
share of benefits reaped by the coalition, reducing the incentives to join a coalition. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have examined the impact of increasing the fat tail of the distribution of 
climate change damages on the stability and performance of international mitigation 
agreements. More specifically, the impacts of variations in the fat tail on the formation of 
(stable) coalitions amongst twelve major world regions, and the resulting abatement efforts, 
were analysed within the applied game-theoretical STACO model. Variations in the fatness of 
the upper tail of the damage distribution were introduced by defining a range of alternative 
scenarios varying in the applied distributional form of climate change damages and by 
altering the parameters of these distributions. While the model is extremely stylised and not 
suited for in-depth analysis of mitigation policies in different countries, the main results can 
be put into the larger context of actual international negotiations on climate change. 
 
First, even countries that do not participate in an international agreement implement policies 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The USA is the typical example. On the one hand, it did 
not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and efforts to implement a federal emission trading scheme (or 
carbon tax) have so far not been successful. On the other hand, it has adopted many policies at 
both state and federal level that effectively curb carbon emissions. OECD (2012) contains 
numerous examples of such mitigation actions by major polluting countries. These mitigation 
policies are also present in the STACO model where, even in the absence of an international 
climate agreement, most regions will undertake abatement efforts relative to their BAU 
scenario. Our main point here, which is confirmed by our simulation runs, is that the usual 
assumption in modelling baselines, that countries not in the coalition do nothing to reduce 
emissions, may well be false.  
 
Within the STACO model, regions decide to abate based on the expected marginal costs and 
benefits of the required emission reduction activities. In the real world, it is impossible to 
verify what drives these unilateral abatement efforts. Emission reductions can be the result of 
co-benefits arising from, for example energy efficiency or energy security policies, but also 
genuine concerns about catastrophic damages may be a driving factor. Empirical verification 
of our first conjecture is further limited by the absence of a counter-factual against which to 
compare current emission trends. Nevertheless, the availability of numerous policy examples 
and an emerging literature on implicit carbon prices in different countries (e.g. Productivity 
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Commission, 2011) does point to some evidence that even in absence of a binding 
international agreement countries see scope for mitigation policies. 
 
Secondly, by not being part of a larger coalition, regions are likely to conduct less abatement 
because they are unable to benefit from possible burden sharing schemes (i.e. monetary 
transfers) between members of the coalition. That is, while developing countries are in 
general more vulnerable to climate change than developed countries, the sheer size of 
economic assets at risk in developed countries imply that they have a large incentive to induce 
global mitigation action, and it is in their interest to assist developing countries financially. In 
this light, the US$100bn international climate fund agreed upon in Cancún in 2010, is 
rational. The STACO model treats such transfers, or flexibility mechanisms, in international 
climate agreements as a way to increase the efficiency of the international agreements by 
splitting the decision of who undertakes mitigation efforts from the decision who pays for it. 
Such flexibility mechanisms are already prominent in the Kyoto Protocol (incl. the Clean 
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation) and are likely to be scaled up in future 
international regimes. 
 
Given that the level of mitigation is less than socially optimal in the unilateral case, our 
analysis shows that an ambitious international agreement can still bring global benefits by 
further reducing climate risks. The fat-tail scenarios show that countries are willing to form 
coalitions to reduce the risk of irreversible climate damages, i.e. shave off the fat tail. We find 
that both, higher expected benefits and fatter upper tails of climate impacts, increase the strict 
stability likelihood of an international climate agreement. Hence, the probability of a stable 
agreement increases in the possibility of low-probability, high-impact climate change 
scenarios. Simultaneously, the expected payoffs are increasing in the likelihood of very high 
climate impacts. This spurs abatement efforts both within and outside coalitions. Thus, fatter 
tails lead to ‘fatter’ climate coalitions in two ways: they increase the performance of existing 
coalitions and they make larger coalitions stable. These observations are in line with many 
countries expressing the need to start (joint) abatement efforts soon.  
 
Thirdly, there remain significant difficulties in striking an ambitious international agreement 
with broad participation. Since Barrett (2003), it is generally clear that international 
agreements may be broad or deep, but not both. In other words, to get wide participation in an 
agreement the stakes (and hence free-rider incentives) should be low, while ambitious 
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agreements will only attract a few members. This is clearly illustrated by the estimated 
parabolic relationship between coalition size and the stability and success of a coalition. Our 
payoff functions show that the stakes are quite high (i.e. mitigation costs are substantial), and 
hence the free-riding incentives make it hard to form a stable coalition. Unfortunately, the 
current state of negotiations seems to confirm this point forcefully. While the number of 
countries that have pledged emission reductions in the Copenhagen Accord, and confirmed 
them in the Cancún Agreements and at the Conference of Parties in Durban, is substantial, the 
joint pledges are generally seen as insufficient to be on a least-cost pathway to keep global 
average temperature increases limited to 2°C (UNEP, 2010; and confirmed by subsequent 
updates in 2011 and 2012).   
 
There is no direct relationship between the 2°C scenario and our analysis of fat-tails, since the 
former is more a political goal than the result of a cost-benefit type of analysis used in the 
STACO model and other integrated assessment models. However, the principles of the Nash 
equilibrium underlying our simulation runs support the emergence of a pledge-and-review 
type international architecture, where pledges are based on voluntary national announcements 
rather than legally binding reduction targets. Our analysis shows that increasing the fatness of 
the upper tail of climate damages makes it more likely that the benefits from abatement will 
match with the marginal costs, thereby providing more scope for a larger coalition. 
 
Although there are clear links with actual policy developments, it goes without saying that the 
numerical results depend on the specification of the model. Dellink (2011) deals with this 
extensively using a deterministic approach. The stochastic approach adopted in this paper is a 
major improvement, given the pessimistic conclusion of Dellink (2011) that “the most 
uncertain assumption [on regional benefits] is also one of the most critical”. Our stochastic 
framework makes the large uncertainties on benefits from abatement efforts explicit and 
traces its impacts on various indicators of the performance of coalitions.  
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Annex I: Distributional forms for the global benefit parameter 
Scenarios 
Factor 
  
Mean 
($/tC) 
Std. dev.  
($/tC)  
Normal Base scenario   120 148  
 Mean 1.5  180 148  
  2  240 148  
  3  360 148  
  4  480 148  
  5  600 148  
 Sigma 1.5  120 222  
  2  120 296  
  3  120 444  
  4  120 592  
  5  120 740  
  
Factor 
 
Lower bound 
($/tC) 
Mean 
($/tC) 
Std dev.  
($/tC)  
Gamma  Reference  -80 120 148  
 Sigma 1.5 -80 120 222  
  2 -80 120 296  
  3 -80 120 444  
  4 -80 120 592  
  5 -80 120 740  
  
Factor 
 
Lower bound 
($/tC) 
Mean 
($/tC) 
Std dev.  
($/tC) 
Upper bound 
($/tC) 
Beta  Reference  -80 120 148 675 
 Mean 1.5 -80 180 148 675 
  2 -80 240 148 675 
  3 -80 360 148 675 
  4 -80 480 148 675 
 Upper bound 1.5 -80 120 148 1012.5 
  2 -80 120 148 1350 
  3 -80 120 148 2025 
  4 -80 120 148 2700 
  5 -80 120 148 3375 
  
Factor 
 
5th % 
($/tC) 
Mode 
($/tC) 
PR<Mode 
 
95th % 
($/tC) 
Exponential  Reference  -45 49 0,3456 410 
 Pr < Mode 0.2 -45 49 0,31104 410 
  0.3 -45 49 0,27648 410 
  0.4 -45 49 0,24192 410 
  0.5 -45 49 0,20736 410 
  0.6 -45 49 0,1728 410 
  0.7 -45 49 0,13824 410 
  0.8 -45 49 0,10368 410 
  0.9 -45 49 0,06912 410 
 95% point 1.5 -45 49 0,3456 615 
  2 -45 49 0,3456 820 
  3 -45 49 0,3456 1230 
  4 -45 49 0,3456 1640 
  5 -45 49 0,3456 2050 
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Annex II: Sample moment for the global benefit parameter 
Scenarios 
Factor 
 
Mean 
($/tC) 
St. dev 
($/tC) 
Skewn. 
 
Kurt. 
 
% < 0 
 
5th %  
($/tC) 
95th %  
($/tC) 
Normal Base scenario  118 148 -0.01 -0.02 21 -124 360 
 Mean 1.5 179 147 0.02 0.00 11 -64 423 
  2 239 148 -0.02 -0.07 5 -4 479 
  3 359 148 0.04 -0.02 0 120 603 
  4 480 148 -0.02 0.05 0 235 723 
  5 600 148 0.00 -0.05 0 359 843 
 Sigma 1.5 118 223 -0.00 -0.00 30 -248 487 
  2 117 295 -0.00 -0.03 34 -368 603 
  3 120 446 0.03 -0.07 40 -609 861 
  4 134 595 0.01 0.03 42 -854 1104 
  5 122 742 0.01 -0.00 44 -1104 1347 
Gamma  Reference  118 146 1.45 3.09 21 -48 401 
 Sigma 1.5 119 221 2.21 7.11 37 -74 564 
  2 120 298 3.00 13.13 50 -79 714 
  3 125 453 4.39 28.08 64 -80 986 
  4 122 600 5.95 51.70 74 -80 1072 
  5 127 785 8.12 105.80 80 -80 1107 
Beta  Reference  119 148 0.78 -0.08 26 -64 408 
 Mean 1.5 180 148 0.46 -0.48 11 -31 449 
  2 239 148 0.20 -0.66 4 8 493 
  3 361 148 -0.23 -0.64 1 105 588 
  4 479 148 -0.81 -0.03 0 190 660 
 Upper bound 1.5 119 148 1.03 0.84 24 -59 412 
  2 120 149 1.18 1.51 23 -56 412 
  3 120 148 1.21 1.69 22 -54 411 
  4 120 147 1.28 2.13 22 -52 411 
  5 120 149 1.38 2.51 22 -51 416 
Exponential  Reference  125 149 1.65 5.42 13 -48 408 
 Pr < Mode 0.2 143 175 -1.36 13.74 6 -58 410 
  0.3 147 148 0.46 4.87 7 -48 416 
  0.4 145 143 1.02 4.91 8 -45 406 
  0.5 142 144 1.23 4.98 9 -45 407 
  0.6 140 145 1.44 5.61 10 -44 411 
  0.7 136 145 1.37 3.90 10 -43 416 
  0.8 133 145 1.41 4.28 11 -45 410 
  0.9 127 147 1.60 5.08 12 -44 405 
 95% point 1.5 174 220 1.93 5.63 13 -45 612 
  2 229 295 2.06 6.30 12 -44 817 
  3 332 440 2.13 6.48 13 -44 1211 
  4 437 595 2.20 6.88 13 -45 1645 
  5 540 742 2.24 7.13 13 -45 2064 
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Annex III  
The countries are classified with respect to benefit and cost characteristics: 
 High benefit Medium benefit Low benefit 
High cost JPN  BRA 
Medium cost EEC IND, ROW OOE, EET, EEC, DAE 
Low cost USA FSU, CHN  
 
Then we sort the 4083 coalitions (all except the AS which is used as the reference coalition in 
the regressions) in nine different classes, based on contribution to effective coalitions, i.e. 
starting with high benefits and low costs and working through the columns of the matrix: 
 High benefit (HB) Medium benefit (MB) Low benefit (LB) 
Low cost (LC) 3199 coalitions 382 0 
Medium cost (MC) 381 94 26 
High cost (HC) 1 0 0 
 
HB/LC specifies a coalition with at least one high-benefit and one low-cost country. HB/MC 
describes a coalition with at least one high-benefit and one medium-cost country and no LC 
country in the coalition. HB/HC describes a coalition that includes at least one high-benefit 
and one high-cost country, and no MC or LC countries. Using the same procedure, we 
classified medium-benefit and low-benefit coalitions. Therefore, the nine categories are 
mutually exclusive and coalitions not double-counted.  
 
If a coalition consists of for instance JPN (HB/HC) and OOE (LB/MC) and CHN (MC/LC), it 
would be classified as HB/LC, because JPN has high benefits and CHN low costs and it thus 
has the most favourable combination for effective cooperation. It does not matter how many 
countries are in a coalition, for the classification we just take into account the most “extreme” 
members. 
 
